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Abstract 
Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) commenced in 1998 and after two decades it 
is timely to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the reform experience.  The centrepiece 
of NEM reforms was the energy-only wholesale market and accompanying forward markets, 
and for most of the past 20 years it has displayed consistent economic and technical 
performance.  But missing policies relating to climate change, natural gas and plant exit has 
recently produced results that have tested political tolerances.  The piecemeal and random 
interventions that are now following are likely to inflame rather than resolve matters, at least 
over the near term.  Network policy failures in the mid-2000s led to sharp regulated tariff 
increases from 2007 onwards. These policy problems were largely cauterized by 2012 but 
regulatory timeframes and business inertia meant network tariffs didn’t stabilise until 2015.  
The retail market has been forced to deliver sharply rising prices, and in consequence the 
problem of rising prices has been conflated with price discrimination; a largely unhelpful 
development in an otherwise workably competitive market.    
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1. Introduction 
Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) formed part of a world-wide electricity industry 
microeconomic reform experiment which as Pollitt (2004) notes, commenced in Chile in 1982.  The 
NEM, which covers the eastern and south eastern states of Australia2, reached its 20th birthday in 
December 2018.  The centerpiece of the NEM reform is the wholesale market, an energy-only gross 
pool with a real-time spot market and forward derivatives market – the former coordinating 
scheduling and dispatch, the latter tying the economics of the physical power system to Resource 
Adequacy and new capacity.  By virtually any metric, for most of the past two decades the wholesale 
market has been a marvel of microeconomic reform3.  A vast oversupply of generation plant was 
cleared, unit costs plunged, plant availability rates reached world class levels, requisite new 
investment flowed when required, investment risks were borne by capital markets rather than captive 
consumers, and reliability of supply – in spite of an energy-only market design – has been maintained 
with few exceptions thanks to a very high Value of Lost Load (VoLL); at A$14,500/MWh4 it is 
amongst the highest in the world.   
 
However, over the past two years the wholesale market has struggled to maintain prices within 
politically tolerable limits, and one region (South Australia) experienced a black system event.  
Causes can be traced to i). adverse effects of climate change policy discontinuity, which punctured 
new plant investment continuity; ii). sudden and uncoordinated exit of coal plant at-scale, driven by 
climate change policy discontinuity; and iii). turmoil in the adjacent market for natural gas, which 
would otherwise provide the transitional fuel and shock absorbers required for coal plant exit at-scale 
(Simshauser, 2019a).   
 
 
♣ Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  
♠ Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
1 Written for the Handbook on the Economics of Electricity. 
2 Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. 
3 I should acknowledge Danny Price (Frontier Economics) for this description, which was contained in one of his recent speeches. 
4 $14,500 is in fact the Market Price Cap.  Estimates of the Value of Lost Load are considerably higher but for the purposes of this research, 
VoLL is used. 
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The NEM wholesale market is attempting to transition without the transitional fuel, and without a 
united & synchronized climate change and energy policy architecture.  Indeed, the climate change 
policies that have existed were poorly designed in that they tended to collide with the NEM design by 
breaking essential links between investment requirements and system operations via certificate side-
markets and more recently, via off-market government intermediations (Simshauser, 2019b).   
 
Transmission & Distribution Networks across NEM regions are subject to economic regulation based 
on Littlechild’s (1983) incentive-based ‘RPI-X’ approach.  While considerable variation exists 
amongst NEM regions, network performance has been marked by (somewhat ironically) policy-based 
Averch & Johnson (1962) gold plating.  The Regulatory Asset Base of combined networks servicing 
NEM customers surged from A$32 billion in 2004 to $93 billion in 2018 while aggregate demand 
tracked sideways5.  Underlying policy problems were cauterized by 2012, but business inertia and 
time lags between regulatory determinations meant network tariffs did not alter from their sharply 
rising trajectories until 2015. 
 
Retail markets have been forced to deliver this bad news to customers through sharply rising retail 
prices.  Retail markets followed the British approach to Full Retail Contestability, albeit with different 
NEM regions adopting contestability and price deregulation at different timeframes, which in turn 
were driven by local political constraints.  As with the wholesale market, the NEM’s contestable retail 
markets have by-and-large been successful; although as with Great Britain, more recently consumer 
groups and politicians have conflated the problem of rising electricity prices with price discrimination 
– a largely unhelpful development.  The term ‘loyalty tax’ for sticky customers made its media cameo 
in 2018 and the policy of re-introducing regulated tariff caps soon followed.  Unfortunately for the 
market, at the time of writing both the Commonwealth Government and Victorian State Governments 
had drafted re-regulation legislation.6 
 
One of the more interesting aspects of the Australian market model, if not a dry aspect, are the 
governance arrangements.  First and foremost, although the ‘N’ in NEM stands for National, energy 
and energy policy is the domain of State Governments, not the Commonwealth Government.  
Historically, vertical monopoly Electricity Commissions were developed, owned and operated by the 
respective State Governments.  Given the power system was built up around state borders, the fact 
that Australia has a centrally coordinated competitive National market at all is remarkable given the 
political coordination required in its establishment.  From an institutional design perspective, the 
functions of rule-making, regulation and market operations are strictly separated amongst three 
entities; the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), the Australian Energy Regulator and 
the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), respectively.  Policymaking and ultimate oversight 
of the energy industry occurs through a body known as ‘COAG Energy Council’ (Council of 
Australian Governments – Energy Council) comprising the Energy Ministers from each State 
Government and the Commonwealth Minister.   
 
In contrast to energy policy, climate change policy is the domain of the Commonwealth Government.  
Unfortunately, the democratic Labor and conservative Liberal parties have been unable to identify 
common ground for decarbonizing Australia’s CO2 intensive power system for almost two decades 
(with the core of disagreement occurring within the Liberal party itself).  As with the USA and 
Canada, whenever the Commonwealth has misaligned climate change policies with Australia’s 
international commitments (e.g. most recently, the Paris Agreement), piecemeal State Government 
policy activity emerges to fill the void demanded by business and stakeholders, but the design of these 
policies has frequently been incompatible with the NEM’s wholesale market design.   
 
 
5 See Simshauser & Akimov (2019). 
6 The policy was originated by the Commonwealth (in a highly politicised manner) and largely driven by an inquiry by the Australian 
Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC).  The view taken by the ACCC in their draft and final reports were erroneous and 
inconsistent with the economics of price discrimination.  The Commonwealth Government sought to implement a regulated price cap 
regime, it was not supported by other state and territory governments (with the exception of Victoria – which sought to do so in its own 
right), and the rule-making body, the Australian Energy Markets Commission (AEMC) which is accountable to all State, Territory & 
Commonwealth Energy Ministers, formed an entirely (and justifiably) different view, and advised against the proposed change.    
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The purpose of this article is to review the NEM’s performance over the past two decades, and to 
highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the Australian reform experiment.  This article is structured 
as follows; Section 2 provides a brief background to Australian energy market reform.  Section 3 
reviews the governance structure while Section 4 examines industrial organization in the NEM.  
Section 5-7 then analyse the performance of the wholesale market, regulated networks and retail 
markets, respectively.  Section 8 presents strengths and weaknesses of the Australian approach to 
energy market reform.  Conclusions follow.  
 
2. Background to Australian Electricity Market Reforms 
Prior to the 1990 reforms, vertically integrated monopoly electricity utilities were public assets built-
up within state boundaries.  State Electricity Commissions were non-taxpaying entities, responsible to 
their State Government owners vis-à-vis system planning, investment, system operations, reliability of 
supply and tariffs.  As with many vertical utilities around the world, during the 1980s and early-1990s 
the status of the monopoly power generation industry in South-Eastern Australia7 was bordering on 
critical; New South Wales had invested in so much baseload capacity that it would take more than 20 
years to clear, while Victoria’s excess baseload plant investments adversely affected that State’s 
Credit Rating.8  Electricity tariffs were substantially above competitive levels and consequently, the 
requirement for, and objectives of, microeconomic reform were clear. 
 
Microeconomic reform of Australia’s power industry can be traced back to 1991 when the 
Commonwealth Government initiated a national inquiry via one of its economics agencies, the 
Productivity9 Commission.  What evolved was a recommendation to restructure, deregulate and 
establish a 4-state interconnected grid covering east and south-eastern Australia; viz. Queensland 
(QLD), New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC) and South Australia (SA).10  The island state of 
Tasmania (TAS) would later be interconnected by an undersea HVDC cable.  Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory could not be connected due to geographical distances.   
This reform would create Australia’s National Electricity Market or NEM.  Co-operation amongst 
participating State Governments was essential, and was successfully achieved.  Australian reforms 
were largely inspired by the British & Wales electricity market template.  There were four key steps 
to reform: 
1. State-owned monopoly Electricity Commissions were ‘corporatised’ (i.e. commercialised).  
These entities became businesses incorporated under Australian Corporations Law, were 
given a commercial mandate and profit motive, and subsequently exposed to a taxation 
equivalence regime.   
 
2. Corporatised monopoly utilities were then vertically restructured into three segments; 
generation, transmission and distribution/retail supply, within existing state boundaries.  The 
credit standing of each business was also simulated ‘as if’ the firm was non-government 
owned, which removed any perceived benefit that may otherwise arise in transacting and 
raising capital.  This corporatisation process proved to be a critical step in levelling the 
playing field and removing any residual unfair advantage that would otherwise exist. 
 
3. Competitive segments of generation and retail supply were horizontally restructured into a 
number of rival entities within each region.   
 
 
7 The exception to this was the Queensland Electricity Commission, which at that time had the 5th lowest electricity prices in the world.  See 
Booth (2000).   
8 Following a serious down-grading, a Labor Victorian State Government was virtually forced to privatise its newest power station as a 
result. 
9 The Productivity Commission was actually then known as the Industry Commission. 
10 In 1992, the Federal Government established a committee to investigate a national competition policy framework.  The committee handed 
down its blueprint for the implementation of a formal competition policy in August of 1993, with the report becoming known as ‘The 
Hilmer Report’, after the committee chairman, Professor Fred Hilmer.  See Hilmer (1995). 
Page 4 
 
4. Businesses were privatised but the timing of this final stage varied considerably across NEM 
due to regional political agendas.  VIC privatised its electricity businesses in the late-1990s, 
SA followed in the early-2000s, QLD privatised its retail supply businesses (in the Southeast 
corner) in 2007 and after a number of failed attempts, has since resolved to retain the balance 
of the industry in public ownership (including transmission, distribution, and two rival 
generation business with ~60% market share).  NSW privatised its merchant generation and 
retail supply businesses in the early-2010s and sold half of the regulated network businesses 
in the mid-2010s in spite of a bitter partisan campaign between the two major political parties, 
Labor and Liberal.  In TAS, the industry remains publicly owned.11   
 
It is notable that the NEM inherited a high-quality and oversupplied stock of monopoly-built utility-
scale plant at inception, and thus gains from exchange via a competitive energy-only gross pool and 
associated forward derivatives market would be material.  Table 1 contrasts the NEM’s commencing 
generation fleet with a modelled ‘optimal plant mix’.  Note that the NEM was substantially 
overweight base plant, with around 4100MW of excess supply – located mainly in the states of VIC 
and NSW.  Intermediate plant was roughly even, while peaking plant was underweight by 1600MW.  
The system was oversupplied in aggregate by around 2600MW against a then optimal plant stock of 
~30,600MW and a coincident system maximum demand of about 25,000MW.   The market value of 
the structural faults at the time were ~$5 billion or 13% of the (then) $44 billion NEM generating 
portfolio. 
Table 1 -  NEM generating plant portfolio balance in 1998 
 
Source: Simshauser (2008) 
3. Industrial Organisation 
Before the wholesale market commenced, it was necessary to restructure state-owned monopoly 
Electricity Commissions.  Accordingly, during the 1990s the four vertical utilities in QLD, NSW, VIC 
and SA12 were restructured into 16 portfolio generators13, 5 transmission entities and 15 
distribution/retail supply14 entities around state/NEM region boundaries.  Over time, industrial 
organisation would depart from this original NEM blueprint through three dimensions; vertical 
boundaries, horizontal boundaries and geographic lines.   
Initially, the 15 incumbent (i.e. franchise) Retailers were stapled to a host monopoly Distribution 
Network.  This ‘retailer-distributor model’ was common to Great Britain and Australia at reform onset 
which, as Helm (2014, p.2) explains, was ‘the best that could be done at the time’ due to the difficulty 
of splitting such complex business interfaces, and, it ensured retail supply businesses had substantial 
asset backing.   
But horizontal boundaries would be altered; the lack of scope economies and vastly different risk 
profiles meant all distribution networks in the NEM (and in Great Britain) would divest their retail 
 
1111 As an aside, privatisation of the industry (historic decisions and future possibilities) remains highly politically contentious in all 
jurisdictions. 
12 Tasmania is somewhat complicated by the fact that it only joined the NEM in 2006, and for a range of reasons including scale, remained a 
largely monopoly/monopsony regional market. 
13 This included 4 portfolio generators in QLD, 4 in NSW (including Snowy Hydro), 5 in VIC, 3 in SA and 1 in TAS. 
14 This included 2 in QLD, 6 in NSW, 1 in the ACT, 5 in VIC and 1 in SA (and from 2005, 1 in TAS). 
NEM 1997/98 Optimal Actual
(MW) (MW)
  Baseload 20,400        24,500      4,100 overweight
  Intermediate 2,000          2,100        100 overweight
  Peaking 8,200          6,600        -1,600 underweight
 Total 30,600        33,200      2,600 oversupplied
Portfolio balance 
(MW)
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supply businesses.  These downstream structural separations were ‘value-driven’ investor events.15  
While a seemingly benign development, being stapled to a Distribution Network meant a Retail 
business was credit-wrapped by the investment-grade rating of very substantial regulated ‘poles & 
wires’ businesses.  Separation of Retail from Networks meant the presence of investment-grade credit 
had been withdrawn from the merchant market in a two-step process. First, through the withdrawal of 
government ownership, and second, through the separation of Retailers from investment-grade 
monopoly Network Networks. This would later have profound implications for industrial 
organisation.   
Electricity supply is among the most capital-intensive industries in the world and understanding 
capital flows is therefore very important.  Why is the presence of investment-grade credit important 
for the merchant/deregulated market for generation plant?  Credit metrics applied to project 
financings, an historically dominant source of capital for capital-intensive new power generating 
equipment, were tightened by project banks from ca.2004 in direct response to prolonged periods of 
low prices, generator economic losses and episodes of ‘missing money’ (see Section 5) in various 
energy markets around the world.16  As a result, timely investment in new plant would require the 
involvement of an investment-grade credit-rated entity, either as principal investor or as the 
underwriter of long-dated Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).  This was an entry hurdle not 
envisaged by policymakers or academics during market design phase.  Changes in credit parameters 
and applied by risk-averse project banks was not unique to Australia – it was a characteristic of 
energy markets around the world (see Finon, 2008; 2011). Accordingly, changes to industrial 
organisation would follow.   
1. The 15 incumbent Retailers lacked scale17 and progressively consolidated horizontally to 
remain competitive – and this occurred amongst both privatised retailers, and amongst 
government-owned Retailers.  Indeed, the States of QLD and NSW consolidated their own 
retail supply businesses from nine down to just four prior to, or during, privatisation processes 
in 2007 and 2011 respectively.18 By 2011, three ‘incumbent’ Retailers emerged in the NEM 
from a long-line of government privatisations, Merger and Acquisition events.  Curiously, 
State Governments, the Commonwealth Government and Australia’s competition regulator 
waived these horizontal mergers and privatisations through – prioritising proceeds and 
ownership over market concentration and competition. 
 
2. Re-integration became a visible trend as the three incumbent Retailers pursued reverse 
vertical integration with merchant generation, thus becoming known as ‘the Gentailers’.  
Furthermore, forward integration became a dominant strategy amongst incumbent merchant 
generators – many of which now form large vertical businesses in their own right.  A further 
15-20 new entrant retailers formed the competitive fringe. Somewhat ironically, most 
policymakers view vertical re-integration, not horizontal consolidation, as the unwelcome 
development.   
Opposition to vertical boundary changes appears amongst a majority of regulators and policymakers 
in the NEM.19 Their a priori reasoning is vertical acquisitions collide with the NEM blueprint, may 
reduce forward market liquidity, and in turn adversely impact ‘balances of competition’.  By this 
logic, vertical integration was presumed to be anti-competitive.  However, and to be perfectly clear on 
 
15 That is, stock markets were consistently under-valuing the combined distributor-retail businesses.  In all cases, sum-of-the-parts valuations 
revealed structural separation would result in better Total Shareholder Returns. 
16 Especially the USA, UK and Australia.  For further details, see Joskow (2006), Finon (2008), Simshauser (2010) or Nelson & Simshauser 
(2012). 
17 In the Australian utilities sector, investment-grade credit notionally commences with firm earnings of $100 million or greater.  Hence 
scale is not unimportant from a credit rating perspective. 
18 There were originally three franchise retailers in Queensland and six in New South Wales.  In Queensland, Origin Energy and AGL 
Energy purchased the retail businesses.  In New South Wales, Origin Energy and Energy Australia purchased the retail businesses. 
19 See for example AER (2011) and in the case of Great Britain, see Ofgem (2014). 
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this, with the exception of bottleneck infrastructure20 the weight of theoretical and empirical evidence 
on vertical integration overwhelmingly concludes the opposite (see Cooper et al. 2005; Lafontaine & 
Slade, 2007; Mansur, 2007; Joskow, 2010; Simshauser et al. 2015).21  To the extent that market power 
issues occasionally arise in the NEM, their common underpinnings are horizontal power, not vertical 
power – something which seems to have bedevilled the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC).   
4. Governance of Australia’s NEM 
The NEM officially commenced in December 1998 but from 2006, governance arrangements 
underwent a structural change of their own with policy, rule-making, regulation and market operations 
strictly segregated:   
 
• Policy – Energy Ministers from each NEM State and the Commonwealth form the members 
of the Council of Australian Governments Energy Council (i.e. COAG Energy Council); 
 
• Rule-making – the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) operate on behalf of 
COAG Energy Council as the market rule-making entity and policy advisor, and has 
established an open-source platform for doing so; 
 
• Regulation – the Australian Energy Regulator enforces wholesale and retail supply Rules, and 
is the economic regulator of the NEM’s regulated networks; and 
 
• Market operations – the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) is the Independent 
System Operator. 
 
o More recently22, an Energy Security Board (ESB) was inserted above the three 
market institutions (i.e. AEMC, AER and AEMO) for a time-limited period in an 
attempt to assist policy co-ordination following the black system event in SA.  The 
ESB comprises the heads of the AEMC, AER and AEMO, and an independent Chair 
and Deputy Chair.  
 
A defining characteristic of Australia’s NEM is its ‘open source’ approach to rulemaking, in which 
the AEMC consistently attempts to capture the wisdom of the crowd, that is, from market participants, 
capital markets, consumer groups and industry stakeholders.  Under Australia’s NEM rules, the 
system operator, the regulator, any market participant, investor, consumer group, interested entity or 
individual can originate a rule change.  The AEMC is the institution charged with running a politically 
independent Rule Change process in a manner consistent with the National Electricity Objective23 and 
does so using a conventional policy development cycle incorporating i). an initial issues paper, ii). a 
formal public consultation processes, iii). draft determination subject to a further round of 
consultation, and iv). final determination.  There are four channels to originate a Rule Change: 
 
 
20 An electricity transmission line linking generation and retail load is an example of bottleneck infrastructure. 
21 Vertical integration is an organisational form of last resort that occurs in response to non-trivial market frictions and in most 
circumstances, is welfare enhancing – even when horizontal issues take on a considerable importance.  Once the long list of explicit and 
implicit assumptions underpinning standard economic models are relaxed, boundary changes are likely when firms face hazards associated 
with asset specificity, incomplete markets, bounded rationality, asymmetric information and regulatory & policy uncertainty.  When non-
trivial hazards exist in relation to ex ante investment commitment and the ex post performance of highly specific assets, vertical integration 
will invariably achieve ‘more adaptive, sequential decision-making procedures’ than anonymous spot and forward market transactions, 
especially as market conditions change (see Williamson, 1973).   
22 In an earlier market review by Australia’s Chief Scientist on behalf of COAG Energy Council, one recommendation was to add an Energy 
Security Board.  In my view, it grinded against the structural separation but given the black system event in SA, COAG Energy Council had 
little choice but to endorse the recommendation.  Of course, the black system event had nothing to do with policy coordination – it was 
strictly a matter of System Operations. 
23 That is, to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers 
of electricity with respect to: price, quality, safety and reliability and security of supply of electricity. 
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1. Normal Rule Change:  the AEMC initiates its policy development cycle within 4 months of 
receiving a Rule Change Request and must complete its process within 6 months (i.e. 10 
months in total);  
 
2. Expedited Rule Change:  can be made within just 8 weeks.  However, a prerequisite to this 
channel is the existence of a (typically prior) formal consultation process either by a 
proponent or by the AEMC; 
 
3. Fast-Track Rule Change:  where no prior consultation exists, a rule change can be originated 
and policy development cycle completed within 3 months, but with the prerequisite that a 
genuine threat to power system security or reliability exists.  
 
 It is worth noting that AEMO has sole responsibility for real-time system security, but is 
not responsible for Resource Adequacy (i.e. system reliability and associated Resource 
Adequacy is delivered through the NEM’s very high VoLL and the forward markets).  
However, AEMO can initiate Emergency Trader Provisions if short-term Resource 
Adequacy is likely to compromise system security.  AEMO also benefits from NEM Rule 
4.3.1 which states amongst other things that the System Operator should “initiate action 
plans to manage abnormal situations or significant deficiencies which could reasonably 
threaten power system security”.  Deficiencies are noted without limitation, viz. i). power 
system Frequency and/or voltage operating outside the definition of a satisfactory 
operating state, and ii). actual or potential power system instability.     
 
4. Market Development Rule Change:  the AEMC can propose a Rule Change to COAG Energy 
Council, which in turn would have the effect of originating a rule change.  For clarity, the 
AEMC cannot propose a rule change to itself. 
 
The AEMC assesses any Rule Change against statutory objectives (viz. the five AEMC 
Commissioners are bound by these statutory objectives including, above all, ‘the long-term interests 
of consumers’). A common criticism that I hear – including from Energy Ministers, Senior Officials, 
consumer groups, lobby groups and (non-market facing) renewable project developers/investors – is 
the slow speed of change vis-à-vis the NEM Rules.  Conversely, I rarely hear such complaints from 
the capital-intensive market-facing participants who have made large investment commitments in 
plant and retail systems based on their understanding of market rules, nor from sophisticated debt and 
equity capital market participants who ultimately fund these market-facing participants.  These latter 
groups may not like the outcome of various Rule changes, but they value the politically independent 
rule-making process and the stability of the NEM Rules (noting that the problem of climate change 
policy is not the domain of the AEMC or the Rules). 
 
Most Rule processes are completed within 9-12 months.  And while there is considerable evidence of 
NEM Rule change processes of urgency being the subject of delay, what virtually all stakeholders do 
not observe is the cause of delays.  In almost every case, delays can be traced to COAG Energy 
Council – when the form of an AEMC Rule Change is materially altered in the legal drafting stage 
(viz. over-reach by a jurisdiction trying to achieve some ‘additional policy objective’), all prior 
consultation process previously undertaken by the AEMC are no longer relevant.  Consequently, 
under its statutory responsibilities, AEMC Commissioners are obliged to re-initiate the policy 
development cycle once again.  Observable rule-making process delays have an uncanny correlation 
with the level of interest and decision making-authority by COAG Energy Council and their Senior 
Officials – of which I have first-hand experience24.  In an outlier example, a Fast Track Rule Change, 
which should have taken 3 months to complete, took 3½ years to implement because of over-reach by 
a particular State Government attempting to deliver tangential policy outcomes. 
 
24 The Author was the Director-General of the Queensland Department of Energy and Water Supply and the Queensland Government’s 
Senior Official for COAG Energy Council from 2015-2017. 
Page 8 
 
5. Wholesale Market 
As noted at the outset, for most of the past two decades the economic and technical performance of 
the NEM’s wholesale market has been exceptional in that following reform, costs reduced, prices fell 
to competitive levels, plant oversupply was cleared and the NEM’s reliability criteria of ‘no more 
than 0.002% lost load’ was met (see Simshauser, 2005; 2014).  One could conclude with considerable 
justification that the reform objectives of enhancing productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency 
were achieved.25  Indeed, the NEM design was widely regarded as a template for power system 
reform (see IEA, 2005; Warren, 2019).     
 
But recent performance of Australia’s wholesale market has been tarnished by a black system event in 
SA (Australia’s first system collapse in since 1964), with spot & forward electricity prices surging 
outside of politically tolerable levels.   To be clear, the NEM market design remained faithful with 
prices reflecting resource costs.  Key problems have been sequential supply-side shocks; i). poor 
design and discontinuity of climate change policies; ii). gas market shortages, and iii). uncoordinated 
coal plant exit at-scale without adequate notification periods, because of i) above.  As this Section 
explains, the NEM is attempting to transition without the transitional fuel, and without the climate 
change policies that should guide any transition (Simshauser & Tiernan, 2019). 
 
 Institutional design 
The NEM is somewhat unique amongst restructured electricity market designs due to its single real-
time platform comprising a mandatory energy-only gross pool spot electricity market and eight co-
optimised Frequency Control Ancillary Service spot markets, operating across five imperfectly 
interconnected regions with 5-minute dispatch resolution (MacGill, 2010).  Prices are cleared under a 
uniform first-price auction clearing mechanism, and a single Independent Market Operator 
coordinates all regions and all spot markets; and again somewhat uniquely, without any formal day-
ahead market26 or centrally determined capacity mechanism (see Riesz et al. 2015).  Future plant 
capacity is guided by the NEM’s forward markets; derivative contracts are traded both on-exchange 
and Over-The-Counter (OTC) and have historically exhibited turnover of 300+% of physical trade, 
albeit with considerable variation between seasons and regions.  Reliability (i.e. Resource Adequacy) 
is thus driven by future price expectations and underpinned by an extremely high VoLL of 
$14,500/MWh – the level of VoLL having a direct relationship with the reliability objective function; 
to ensure no more than 0.002% lost load.   
 
 Historic market prices   
For most of the past two decades, spot prices spanned a relatively tight range.  From 1998-2015, 
annual spot prices averaged $40/MWh (i.e. ~US$28/MWh27) with a P90 - P10 range of $27 - 
57/MWh (US$18.90 - 39.90/MWh).  These spot prices were underpinned by Australia’s low coal 
coal-fired generation fleet.  Figures 1-2 present historic average spot prices (6-month resolution) in 
nominal and real 2018 dollars, and contrast these with the Average Total Cost (ATC) of the 
incumbent coal fleet, and estimated New Entrant Cost28 relevant at the time.  There are four things 
worth noting in Figures 1-2: 
 
1. Spot prices experienced two major excursions.  The first (2007-2008) coincided with 
Australia’s east coast millenial drough. Apart from adverse effects on hydro plant, drought 
conditions were so severe that some coal-fired generators were forced to mothball units due to 
cooling water shortages (urban drinking water being prioritised from affected dams).  The 
second (2017-2019) persisted at the time of writing due to coal plant exit at-scale (see Section 
5.4) and turmoil in the adjacent market for natural gas (see Section 5.5). 
 
 
25 Performance improvements included average cost, price, plant availability, and reserve margins (see Simshauser, 2005). In more recent 
research, the wholesale market was one of the few areas of the electricity market that was performing well (see for example Nelson & Orton, 
2016; Simshauser, 2014).  From mid-2016 however, market performance deteriorated significantly. 
26 Although as MacGill (2010) points out, the Market Operator does produce a very transparent 40hr pre-dispatch forecast which is 
continuously updated. 
27 I use a AUD to USD exchange rate of $0.70.   
28 Average Total Cost and New entrant Cost data from Simshauser (2019a). 
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2. The New Entrant Cost series in Figures 1-2 exhibits a steep incline from 2005-2012 which 
coincides with a shift in the benchmark entrant technology, from coal to gas, and in line with 
expectations of a carbon constraint.  Domestic gas prices rose sharply following a series of 
LNG export commitments, which had the effect of linking domestic gas prices with the 
seaborne market rising from $3/GJ to $9/GJ (~US$2.21 to US$6.85/MMbtu) over the period 
2005-2012. By 2016, the cost of renewables had fallen considerably and even after 
accounting for intermittency (by way of an OCGT), became the new benchmark entrant. 
 
3. While not captured in Figures 1-2, the marginal running cost of the NEM’s coal-fired fleet is 
now beginning to rise; legacy coal supply agreements at a number of marginal coal plants 
across QLD and NSW have been progressively expiring, and replacement contracts are now 
based on the 5500kcal coal futures contract (export price ex-Newcastle, north of Sydney).  
International thermal coal prices are materially higher (currently ~US$90/t) than legacy 
contract prices (historically ~A$30-40/t). 
 
4. Australia had a carbon price from 2012-2014, but the (democratic)Labor Government’s 
policy was short-lived following a bitter general election campaign in which the carbon price 
(labelled the ‘great big tax on electricity’ by the (conservative) Liberal Opposition) formed 
centre stage.  A core election commitment, the incoming Liberal Government dismantled the 
policy within 9 months.  
 
 20-year NEM Spot Prices vs Incumbent Coal and New Entrant Cost: 1999-2018 (nominal) 
 
Source: AEMO, ABS, Simshauser (2019a). 
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 NEM Spot Prices vs Incumbent Coal and New Entrant Cost: 1999-2018 (constant 2018 $) 
 
Source: AEMO, ABS, Simshauser (2019a). 
 
 Reliability & Reserve Plant 
From a Resource Adequacy perspective, the NEM’s Reliability Panel sets the criteria and reviews 
overall power system performance.  The reliability criteria has been achieved with few exceptions. 
NEM outage analysis by Grattan (2019) covering the period 2009-2019 identified that only 0.1% of 
system minutes lost related to generation plant shortfalls – the balance arising from a black system 
event in South Australia29 (1.6%), transmission plant outages (0.7%) and distribution network outages 
(97.7%).   
 
Figure 3 presents NEM reserve plant based on nameplate capacity (which has the effect of overstating 
the apparent Reserve Plant cf. thermal de-rating during summer peak periods).  More important 
however are Year-on-Year changes in reserve plant.   During the transition from monopoly to 
competitive market, QLD (1998), SA (2000) and VIC (2001) experienced supply disruptions but these 
were legacy issues, not market design issues (noting the NEM commenced in 1998).  In response, 
market-based supply-side additions commissioned in 2002-2004 were swift, as Figure 3 illustrates.   
 
In 2009, VIC experienced supply disruptions following a very material jump in maximum demand 
and coincident lags to peaking plant capacity additions. These events coupled with the 2007-2008 
price cycle, and the (then) looming expectation of a CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme, led to a large 
number of gas-fired capacity additions from 2009-2012 as Figures 6-7 later reveal.  However as this 
capacity was commissioned, NEM aggregate demand contracted (for the first time in history) 
throughout 2010-2015.  Australia’s 20% Renewable Energy Target would also force more plant into 
the market (through an adjacent certificate ‘side-market’) and combined this led to reserve plant 
margins increasing materially.  These conditions would eventually weigh heavily on spot electricity 
prices and culminate in aged coal plant exit at-scale (see Section 5.4).  This coal plant exit procession 
produced a sharp run-down in reserve plant, which is visibly noticeable from 2015 onwards.   
 
 
29 The SA black system event was not a Resource Adequacy / Reliability problem, but a system security issue (i.e. an unstable system in 
which a voltage collapse led to plant disconnecting, with the rate of change of frequency falling faster than supply and demand resources 
could respond to. 
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 NEM Reserve Plant (2000-2017) Nameplate vs Maximum Demand 
 
Source: ESAA, AEC. 
 
 The NEM’s episode of economic losses and exit at-scale 
A known theoretical characteristic of energy-only markets is missing money and risks of timely plant 
entry (see Cramton & Stoft, 2006 amongst others30).  While the NEM’s very high VoLL and 
associated contract markets have ensured Resource Adequacy, the energy-only market design has 
meant the economic consequences of oversupply are amplified.  These have been further compounded 
by the presence of a poorly designed 20% Renewable Energy Target (i.e. use of ‘certificate’ side-
markets).   
 
By combining underlying annual cost and price data from Figure 1 with thermal generation output, an 
estimate of economic losses (including a subcomponent of missing money) over time can be 
established – which is presented in Table 2.  To be clear, Table 2 excludes Ancillary Services 
revenues (typically < 0.5% of system revenues) and hedge contract premiums (nominally ~3-7% 
above spot prices). These are important caveats; but these limitations aside the estimated economic 
loss is $4 billion over the period 1999/00 – 2017/18 against the current capital stock of 46,000MW 
with an estimated value of ~$49.7 billion.31  
  
 
30 See also Neuhoff et al. 2004; de Vries, 2004; de Vries et al. 2008; Bushnell, 2005; Roques et al. 2005; Joskow, 2008; Finon, 2008; 
Simshauser, 2008; Joskow, 2013; Nelson & Simshauser, 2012; Cramton, Ockenfels & Stoft, 2013; Green & Staffell, 2016; Keay, 2016.  
31 Depreciated optimised valuation estimates are based on hydro plant at $1500/kW, coal plant at $1000/kW, CCGT and Solar plant at 
$1500/kW, Wind at $2000/kW and OCGT plant at $500/kW.  Applying these statistics to the NEM’s existing plant equates to $49.7 billion. 
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Table 2 -  Generator economic losses 
 
Source:  AEMO, ESAA, AEC, Simshauser (2019a). 
 
While the aggregate result in Table 2 is -$4 billion of economic losses, note between 2009-2015 
(shaded area) it was ~$11.3 billion – a direct result of plant oversupply.32  This period induced 
uncoordinated coal plant exit at-scale over the period 2012-2017 as outlined in Table 3.  Initial 
closure events (i.e. 2012-2015) were benign as NEM spot prices and Table 2 tend to indicate; they 
were warranted on economic grounds (i.e. oversupply) and consistent with climate change policy 
objectives (i.e. lower emission entrants causing the oversupply).   
 
Table 3 -  NEM coal plant exit 
 
Simshauser (2019a) 
However, the final two plant exits in Table 3 were material, uncoordinated and occurred with little 
warning. The 540MW Northern Power Station, the last coal-fired plant in the NEM’s SA region, 
announced it would close in mid-2016.  With spot revenues declining and plant costs rising (i.e. 
falling availability and utilisation) closure became the dominant strategy.  Two months later, 
 
32 Untangling missing money from within the economic loss is a difficult task, but my own prior estimates of VoLL were considerably 
higher than $14,500/MWh.  In Simshauser (2008) the estimate was $24,500/MWh vs. the then VoLL of $10,000/MWh. 
Year ATC NEM Price Shortfall Generation Missing Money
($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) (TWh) ($ Billions)
2000 35.75 33.36 -2.40 162.9 -0.3
2001 36.52 41.79 5.27 168.8 0.8
2002 37.31 33.63 -3.67 171.9 -0.6
2003 38.11 32.49 -5.62 175.8 -0.9
2004 38.93 29.29 -9.63 182.8 -1.6
2005 39.76 32.71 -7.06 186.0 -1.2
2006 40.62 33.17 -7.45 188.9 -1.2
2007 41.49 55.22 13.73 194.7 2.4
2008 42.39 48.26 5.88 197.8 1.0
2009 43.30 39.11 -4.19 197.4 -0.7
2010 44.23 39.46 -4.76 192.8 -0.8
2011 45.18 31.96 -13.22 187.4 -2.2
2012 46.15 28.83 -17.32 184.9 -2.8
2013 47.14 39.61 -7.53 174.0 -1.2
2014 48.16 33.78 -14.37 168.2 -2.1
2015 49.19 39.60 -9.59 173.4 -1.5
2016 50.25 54.06 3.81 172.9 0.6
2017 51.33 77.10 25.77 169.8 3.9
2018 52.43 82.61 30.18 166.5 4.4
Total 46.09 36.06 -10.03 1,278.1 -4.0
Coal Plant Capacity (MW)
NEM 
Region
Exit   
(Year)
Enter   
(Year)
Age at Exit 
(Years)
Warning 
(Months)
Notice 
Date
Closure 
Date
Swanbank B 500 Qld 2012 1972 40 23.6 26-Mar-10 27-Mar-12
Playford*# 240 SA 2012 1960 52 6.9 7-Oct-15 8-May-16
Collinsville 180 Qld 2013 1972 41 5.9 1-Jun-12 1-Dec-12
Munmorah~ 600 NSW 2013 1969 44 0.0 3-Jul-12 3-Jul-12
Morwell 195 Vic 2014 1958 56 1.0 29-Jul-14 30-Aug-14
Wallerawang~ 1000 NSW 2014 1978 36 0.0 1-Nov-14 1-Nov-14
Redbank 151 NSW 2015 2001 14 0.0 31-Oct-14 31-Oct-14
Anglesea 150 Vic 2016 1969 47 3.6 12-May-15 31-Aug-15
Northern# 540 SA 2016 1985 31 6.9 7-Oct-15 8-May-16
Hazelwood 1600 Vic 2017 1967 50 4.8 3-Nov-16 1-Apr-17
 Total / Average 5156 1972 42.5 5.2
* Mothballed in 2012
# Original notice 11 June 2015 with planned closure date of March 2018
~ Mothballed, Notice was therefore immediate
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unexpectedly, the 1600MW Hazelwood Power Station in the adjacent VIC region (and 20% market 
share) announced it would close in April 2017, i.e. less than 5 months’ notice.  Closure was driven by 
mounting capital re-investment requirements ($400 million) relating to plant safety.  The Northern 
Power Station exit is an example of first mover disadvantage.  While Northern Power Station would 
eventually close due to declining coal resources, it is not obvious that April 2016 was the optimal 
closure date given Hazelwood’s imminent, but unknown, exit timing.  These uncoordinated exits in 
2016-2017 pushed spot electricity prices to multi-year highs and contributed to (but were not the 
cause of) supply disruptions in SA (2016, 2019) and VIC (2019).  The NEM was about to commence 
its transition in earnest, but would be forced to do so without its historically cheap and abundant 
transitional fuel – natural gas.   
 
 Transitioning without the transitional fuel: gas market shortfalls 
Central to current market conditions in the NEM is the dire state of the Australian east coast market 
for natural gas. Following very large coal seam gas discoveries in QLD (i.e 40,000+PJ, or 
6,500+Mboe of 2P Reserves discovered), three large LNG export plants were commissioned in 2014-
2016, resulting in a 3-fold increase in final Australian east coast gas demand (see Simshauser & 
Nelson, 2015; Grafton et al. 2017; Billimoria et al, 2018). This change in aggregate final demand is 
illustrated in Figure 4 (daily resolution) over the period 2009-2018.  Note that there are three market 
segments identified, i). Gas-Fired Power Generation, ii). Final (domestic) Consumer Demand, and iii). 
LNG Exports, which commence from late-2014. 
 Expansion in aggregate demand for natural gas (TJ/day, 2009-2018) 
 
Source: GMAT. 
What Figure 4 does not capture is the under-utilisation of new LNG export plant capacity, and the 
consequential pressure this has placed on the domestic gas market.  Domestic gas prices had 
historically cleared at $3 - 4/GJ (i.e. ~US$2.21 - 2.96/MMbtu) under both short and long-dated 
contracts.  But the advent of LNG export terminals linked the $3/GJ domestic market to a highly 
volatile $8 - $12/GJ netback (~US$5.91 – 8.87/MMbtu) seaborne market.  And because excess LNG 
capacity had been built, marginal supplies in the domestic consumer market are forced to compete 
with sunk LNG export capacity – with domestic prices now clearing at (or above) the seaborne market 
range.  Figure 5 presents the ramp-up and ongoing LNG plant capacity (2014-2018, daily resolution) 
and contrasts this with actual production.  The extent of the visible market shortfall in Figure 5 (i.e. at 
least 1 full LNG train, or about 250-300 PJ/a) is very material – noting that aggregate domestic 
market demand is only 600PJ/a. 
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 Australian East Coast LNG Export Capacity vs LNG Production 
 
Source: GMAT. 
With gas prices surging, legacy long-dated gas supply agreements held by generators (and struck at 
the pre-LNG prices of $3 - $4/GJ) became more valuable as an export feedstock during the low spot 
price period of 2009-2015.  As Figure 6 illustrates, Spark Spreads from 2012-2015 were generally 
negative and well below that which could be sustainably achieved by mothballing a CCGT plant, and 
on-selling the gas to LNG exporters under medium term agreements.  Consequently, many gas 
generators forward-sold their gas to LNG producers and temporarily exited the spot electricity market 
– unaware of looming coal plant exit at-scale from 2016–2017 onwards.  When these plant returned to 
market, their marginal costs were based on export-linked short-term gas prices.  This would also have 
crucial implications for new plant entry, as Section 5.6 explains. 
 NEM Spark Spread (2012-2016) 
 
Source: GMAT, Simshauser (2019a). 
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 Entry and investment commitments: 1999-2018  
Recall from Figures 1-2 that spot prices spiked above the cost of entry during 2017-2018.  A striking 
feature of the current electricity price cycle was the absence of gas turbine proposals, let alone gas 
plant entry.  Gas plant entry was subject to critical hold-up for reasons outlined in Section 5.5. 
During previous electricity price cycles (e.g. 2007-2008, driven by east-coast Australia’s millennium 
drought) more than 5000 MW of gas-fired generation plant entered the coal-dominated NEM as 
Figure 7 illustrates.  In the 2017-2019 cycle, there was no gas plant entry, and as noted above many 
gas-fired generators forward-sold their long term, low cost gas supplies to the chronically short LNG 
export industry during the electricity price lull period unaware that multiple, uncoordinated coal plant 
exit was imminent.  
 New entrant gas-fired plant (1999-2018) 
 
Source: ESAA, AEC, AEMO. 
The entrant of choice in the Australian market has therefore switched to Variable Renewable Energy 
(VRE), principally wind and solar PV.  Their material and timely reduction in entry costs along with 
an undersupplied 20% Renewable Energy Target helped drive a cyclical investment boom as Figure 8 
notes.  Figure 8 builds on Figure 7 by adding in commissioned new entrant VRE plant, and 
irreversible VRE investment commitments (i.e. projects that have reached financial close and are now 
under construction).   
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 New entrant plant (1999-2017) and investment commitments (2017-2018) 
 
Source: ESAA, AEC, AEMO, CEFC. 
While VRE plant has seen record levels of investment, the majority of plant is under construction and 
at the time of drafting in early 2019, is yet to make a dent in prevailing spot and year-ahead forward 
contract prices.   As Figure 21 later reveals, there appears to be a tightening link between average spot 
electricity and average spot gas prices. 
 Market Power in the NEM 
Central to the literature on energy-only markets is the matter of generator market power.  Because 
there are no capacity payments, for an energy-only market to reach equilibrium it must have a high 
VoLL. In real-time, participants are unable to optimise the number of VoLL events.  Actions by 
regulatory authorities and System Operators compound matters by frequently suppressing legitimate 
price signals (de Vries, 2003; Wen et al. 2004; Finon & Pignon, 2008; Joskow 2008, Spees et al., 
2013; Hogan, 2013, Leautier, 2016).  Energy-only markets are therefore rarely in equilibrium, and this 
creates risks for the continuity of timely investment to ensure the administratively determined 
reliability criteria is met (Bidwell & Henney, 2004; Cramton & Stoft, 2006; de Vries & Heijien, 2008; 
Hirth et al. 2016).   In the circular calibration of reliability standards and a high VoLL, the risks and 
ability to distinguish market power events are compounded (Roques et al, 2005; Besser et al, 2002; 
Oren, 2003; Cramton & Stoft, 2006; Joskow 2008; Simshauser, 2008). 
 
In the NEM, the Australian Energy Regulator routinely investigates all price spikes above 
$5000/MWh with the intent of monitoring competitive behaviour and compliance with the market 
Rules.  Because there are no capacity payments, NEM generators are free to bid their output at prices 
up to VoLL, with competitive forces regulating the extent of economic withholding of capacity.  As 
outlined in Table 2, the NEM has generally been characterised by intensely competitive prices – 
especially over the periods 1999-2006 and 2009-2015.   
 
Across the NEM’s four major regions of QLD, NSW, VIC & SA from 1999-2018 (i.e. “80 region 
years”), there have been eight notable episodes of economic withholding of capacity (and no doubt 
countless other minor episodes).  However, half of these events merely reduced the economic losses 
outlined in Table 2.  Table 4 outlines the year, participant, portfolio size (MW), region and the 
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(regional) average spot price relevant to the year in which the economic withholding of generating 
capacity occurred.  Axiomatically, each case involved a large horizontal market participant. 
 
Table 4 -  NEM Market Power Events (1999-2018) 
 
 
From a policy perspective, each withholding event triggered a response.  Responses came in the form 
of i). competition via new entry, ii). regulatory, via Rule change (e.g. bidding in good faith rule, five-
minute settlement rule), iii). in the case of government trading enterprises, intervention by 
government owners, iv). litigation by the Australian Energy Regulator for a Rule breach, or v). longer 
term changes in policymaker attitudes and therefore subsequent policy adjustment. 33    
 
There are two further points worth noting with respect to transient market power events in the NEM.  
First, in all but one case participants were not vertically integrated.  And in the vertical case the source 
of market power was horizontal scale of the generator (privatised by the SA government), not vertical 
boundaries.  Second is the prevalence of market power events involving Government-Owned 
generators.34  As Grattan (2018) explain in their analysis of market power events covering the coal 
plant exit period, the NEM is ‘mostly working’.  
 
 VRE and South Australia 
An article on the NEM would be incomplete without reference to the special case of SA and the 
market implications of a sharply rising VRE market share, i.e. > 50% VRE.  By way of brief 
background, in 1997 Australia established the world’s first Renewable Portfolio Standard.  
Commencing at ‘2% renewables by 2010’, the market share target was lifted to ‘20% renewables by 
2020’ following a general election in 2007.  The national renewable energy policy required all liable 
Retailers to submit sufficient ‘Renewable Energy Certificates’ each year to meet progressively higher 
targets.  As an aside, the 20% target will be comfortably met by 2020.   
 
 
33 Table 4 does exclude a recent event relating to AGL Energy’s bidding behaviour in NSW following their acquisition of the 4600MW 
Macquarie Generation coal portfolio during the mid-2010s – a line of inquiry which had emerged at the time of writing in Mountain & Percy 
(2019).  The issue here was not the typical withdrawal of capacity to very high spot prices, but a soft parallel shift of their supply curve from 
~$20/MWh to ~$50/MWh.  However, while Mountain & Percy (2019) interpreted the shift as market power abuse, it appears a more 
widespread structural shift of the aggregate black coal supply function which has been well documented by AEMO (2018), investigated by 
Australian Energy Regulator and ACCC, and consistent with sharp changes in the 6000 kcal Coal Futures prices.  As a result, crucial 
components of the Mountain & Percy (2019) analysis (relating to coal supply constraints and marginal coal costs) is contentious. 
34 That transient market power has been exercised more frequently in QLD can be explained by the fact that it is the region with i). the least 
vertical integration (i.e. a market dominated by generators with long positions), and ii). the highest reserve margins (Figure 3) and 
consequently economic losses and the missing money subset tends to be amplified (Table 2).   For most of the NEM’s history, QLD has 
been a major net exporter of power to the south and this has produced large reserve margins.  With a surplus of low-cost generating plant, 
economic losses and missing money is likely to be more prevalent.  Conversely, because the supply-side is dominated by a small number of 
large (state-owned) portfolio generators, economic withdrawal of capacity is plausible, profitable and in order to avoid extended periods of 
economic losses, somewhat necessary – noting that not all episodes have actually produced an economic rent.  Importantly however, from a 
policymaker perspective market power events have never been sustained without a response.  That is, economic withholding on the supply-
side has invariably been met by new entrants, policymaker intervention, or a NEM Rule change. 
Year Participant MW Region Spot Price (nominal $)
Est. ATC 
(regional) Spot - ATC 
1999 Tarong Energy* 1900 QLD $53.17 $35.00 $18.17
2000 TXU 1280 SA $59.27 $40.75 $18.52
2001 Loy Yang Power 2000 VIC $44.57 $38.52 $6.05
2003 Enertrade* 2610 QLD $37.79 $38.11 -$0.32
2008 Macquarie Generation* 4600 NSW $41.66 $42.39 -$0.73
2008-10 AGL Energy 1280 SA $59.93 $48.30 $11.63
2013-14^ CS Energy* 4440 QLD $41.21 $47.14 -$5.93
2013-14^ Stanwell* 3854 QLD $41.21 $47.14 -$5.93
2017 Stanwell* 3854 QLD $95.41 $51.33 $44.08
* Government Owned   ^Incl. Carbon Price $23/t
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Inadequate thought went into how the certificated scheme design might be refined and improved35 
when it was expanded from 2% to 20%, and in the event the existing 2% legislation was largely 
rolled-over intact. In the event the scheme collided with the NEM’s wholesale market design -
disconnecting entry decisions from the NEM’s forward markets.  One direct consequence of this was 
the world class wind resources in SA would attract a disproportionate amount of investment because 
of the existence of the certificate side-market, and further compounded by off-market investments (i.e. 
sub-national governments writing off-market CfDs to acquit their own intra-state renewable 
aspirations; the Australia Capital Territory wrote a series of CfDs in the SA region, yet their own load 
is located within the NSW region – a region dominated by scheduled plant, thus leaving SA with 
more VRE plant).  As Figure 9 explains, between 2006 and 2018 VRE plant market share in the 
‘loosely interconnected’ SA NEM region would rise from 0% to 51% (wind dominating at 42 
percentage points).  By comparison, the large and more strongly interconnected regions of QLD, 
NSW and VIC would be greatly under-weight renewables, each with less than 8% VRE market share.   
 
Compounding matters for SA were its small system size (3100MW peak demand, 12.5TWh energy 
demand) and very poor load factor (0.45 – a very peaky power system).  Indeed, SA is by far the 
smallest of the NEM’s four main regions with an underlying base load of just ~1100MW, and as 
indicated above, limited interconnection to the adjacent VIC region.  
 
With an influx of wind generation, the SA region experienced so-called merit order effects from as 
early as 2011 (see Forrest & MacGill, 2013; Cludius et al. 2014; and Bell et al. 2017).  Consistent 
with literature in the field, merit order effects eventually reverse (see Gelabert et al. 2011; Nelson et 
al. 2012) with coal plant forced to withdraw.  SA lost all coal plant generating units over the period 
2012-2016 as Figure 9 illustrates (see also Table 3). 
 
 South Australian generation & VRE market share (2000-2018) 
 
Source: AEMO 
 
Once VRE annual market share rose above ~25%36 coal plant operations became increasingly 
uneconomic.  By the time VRE exceeded ~35% (in 2016), the coal fleet exited, and gas-fired 
 
35 A national target was thought to deliver the target at least-cost, but this ignored other system integration costs from high concentrations in 
certain geographical areas. 
36 This occurred in 2012 with an average VRE market share of 26%, maximum VRE for a single day was 68%, and more than 20 days were 
higher than 50% market share. 
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generation plant provided an expensive shock-absorber given gas price dynamics outlined in Section 
5.5.  The sharp rise in spot prices is illustrated in Figure 10. 
  
 SA generation market share vs. Spot Price37 (Cal Years 2000-2018) 
 
Source: AEMO 
Although SA was visibly changing from a synchronous, dispatchable coal and gas resource-based 
system to one comprising an increasing and dominant level of asynchronous, stochastic wind and 
solar PV resources, AEMO maintained the same levels of Frequency Contingency services (i.e. 6 
second, 60 second and 5 minute spinning reserves), and had reduced the levels of Frequency 
Regulation and Black Start services in prior periods38.  Furthermore, AEMO maintained a practice of 
global procurement of Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) across NEM regions (rather 
than localising some minimum level of FCAS).39  These practices, coupled with a changing plant mix 
and how AEMO chooses to define what constitutes a credible contingency were crucial elements that 
would exacerbate any supply-side shock. 
 
At 4:18pm on 28 September 2016, SA experienced a black system event40.  A severe storm cell with 
wind speeds of 190-250km/h moved through the State and damaged two transmission lines, causing a 
series of voltage dips over a two-minute window.  In real time, SA System Demand was 1826 MW, 
and system dispatch configuration comprised 330MW gas-fired generation, 883MW wind generation 
and 613MW imports through the VIC-SA Interconnector – the latter notably operating at close to its 
rated capacity during the storm event.   
 
 
37 Spot prices in 2013 and 2014 have been adjusted downwards by $23/t x 0.6t per MWh to remove the effects of the CO2 Tax.  The actual 
spot prices were $69.75/MWh and $61.71/MWh respectively. 
38 In my prior role as a Director-General of the Queensland Department of Energy and Senior Official to COAG Energy Council, I had 
argued for a review of FCAS quantities (viz. an increase in regulated FCAS demand, and a localisation of some component of that demand) 
from April 2017.  It appears AEMO failed to anticipate predictable impacts of a changing generation mix.  In a note to stakeholders on 3 
October 2018, AEMO advised that “Regulation FCAS volumes have not been revised for many years, over which time significant system 
changes have occurred; less governor-based frequency support and increased penetration of intermittent generation are most notable”.  
Regulated FCAS quantities were set in 2004 when the NEM had no intermittent renewable resources.  It seems obvious this would be 
inadequate for regions such as SA, which by 2018 had > 50% intermittent resources.  The note to stakeholders followed a series of material 
security events, the most recent being in August 2018 relating to primary frequency control (which put at risk the stability of two entire 
NEM regions including the largest, NSW).   
39 In the NEM, FCAS is determined dynamically in each 5-minute interval (viz. based on the single largest contingency event, loss of the 
largest generator, for example).  FCAS is also procured “globally” across regions subject to network constraints.  In periods of higher 
variability, FCAS regulation procurement automatically rises from the typical set point of 130MW to as much as 230MW (in 60MW 
increments) to maintain Frequency.  Threshold quantities of FCAS Regulation and FCAS Contingency (including 6 second, 60 second and 5 
minute spinning reserves which typically equate to about 990MW in aggregate) remained static as VRE increased. 
40 For full details see https://www.aemo.com.au/Media-Centre/AEMO-publishes-final-report-into-the-South-Australian-state-wide-power-
outage.  
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As a result of the voltage dips, a group of wind turbines operating at ~450MW disconnected from the 
grid (nb. an unknown fault ride-through issue41).  In response, power imported across the main VIC-
SA Interconnector, already operating at close to full load, surged from 613MW to 890MW (i.e. > 
250MW above rated capacity) and within 0.6 of a second, protection systems tripped the 
interconnector offline.  At this point SA was islanded from the balance of the NEM.  Following the 
combined loss of ~450MW wind generation and ~600MW VIC Interconnector flows, contingent 
capacity from indigenous dispatched plant (330MW) and Under Frequency Load Shedding resources 
were simply inadequate to arrest the decline in Frequency – noting that the time lapse of the events 
spanned 2 seconds, at 4:18:15pm as Figure 11 illustrates.   When combined with FCAS (Frequency 
Regulation and 6 second Frequency Contingency), Under Frequency Load Shedding can generally 
arrest a Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) of ~3.5Hz per second.  But notice in Figure 11 that the 
estimated RoCoF was closer to 6.25Hz per second.   
 
 Frequency and Rate of Change of Frequency (various measurement points) 
 
Source: AEMO 
 
How AEMO had configured the SA power system just prior to the Black System event was 
intriguing; the cyclonic conditions and 190+ km/h winds were forecast in advance.  Noting the 
existence of s4.3.1 of the NEM Rules (per Section 4), power system operations immediately prior to 
material weather events in the NEM’s northern region of QLD are always configured differently.  
QLD has a long, skinny network spanning several thousands of kilometres, and the far north of the 
State will typically experience 2-3 cyclones per annum – some of which can be expected to cross the 
network.  The long-standing practice of grid owner (Powerlink) and System Operator (AEMO) in 
periods prior to cyclones crossing land is to invoke a greater reliance on local dispatchable generation 
either side of the weather event (i.e. dispatchable generation plant in the North is constrained-on, out 
of merit order) thus reducing reliance on intra-connector flows from the South in the event of a 
contingency.  Why SA wasn’t similarly configured during their 1-in-50 year storm remains a mystery.  
To be clear, the black system was a system security event, not a Resource Adequacy event.  That is, 
there was more than adequate available generating capacity within the SA region.    
 
AEMO undertook a review and made a series of changes, and the SA government stepped into the 
market and contracted a 100MW Tesla Battery to provide Fast Frequency Response, and added 
~300MW of fast-starting Gas Turbine plant ahead of the looming 2018 and 2019 summer periods 
(given the potential impacts of combined coal plant exits of Northern and Hazelwood Power Stations, 
 
41 The fault related to control systems configurations, which triggered disconnection after two minutes of continuous voltage dips – which in 
hindsight, the wind farms should have been able to ride through). 
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the latter in the adjacent VIC region).  The Battery has thus far proven to be highly effective in 
supplying (and moderating the cost of) Frequency Control Ancillary Services. 
 
 Ongoing challenges for NEM Frequency 
The Normal Operating Frequency Band in the NEM is 50Hz +/-0.015Hz, and system Frequency is to 
be maintained within that Band for > 99% of time.  With more VRE plant entering (per Figure 8), 
NEM Frequency has become increasingly volatile.  AEMO continued to hold FCAS quantities 
constant, at roughly 130MW of Frequency Regulation and ~990MW of combined Regulation and 
Contingency (spinning reserve) resources.  AEMO’s position on FCAS finally changed in early-2019 
when Frequency fell outside the Normal Operating Band’s ‘99% threshold’ (see Figure 12).  
Frequency Regulation has now been increased to ~200MW and remains under active review along 
with the quantity of Frequency Contingency services.  The direction of FCAS volumes was, in my 
view, predictable and long overdue.   
 
 System Operations inside Normal Frequency Band (% of time) 
 
Source: AEMO 
 
6. Networks and Network Regulation 
The Transmission and Distribution (T&D) networks servicing the NEM’s 10 million business and 
residential customers are regulated by the Australian Energy Regulator in rate cases of five years’ 
duration.  The form of regulation is based on Littlechild’s (1983) incentive-based RPI-X, with annual 
regulated revenue caps derived by a traditional building block approach.  Within the revenue cap, 
there is an ability to rebalance tariffs amongst consumer segments within limits, beyond which 
specific regulatory approval is required.  
 
The form of tariffs for end users varies considerably.  For households and small businesses, a 
conventional two-part tariff applies (i.e. fixed rate, variable rate) with the fixed rate ~20% and the 
variable rate ~80% of revenue.  For large Commercial & Industrial customers, conventional three-part 
tariffs (i.e. fixed, variable and demand charge) are generally used. 
 
Capital deployed by Distribution networks tends to be dominated by residential segment peak loads.  
Conversely, adoption of rooftop solar PV has been prolific in the residential sector; Australia has 
among the highest rooftop PV take-up rates in the world.  And this matters because solar PV systems 
greatly reduce energy (kWh) demand, but in certain regions only marginally impact peak (kW) 
demand (for example, see Simshauser, 2016).  Consequently, two-part tariffs dominated by a 
volumetric variable charge are not well suited vis-à-vis rate stability.  But while the economic 
Page 22 
 
justification for reforming residential tariff structures is (in my opinion) compelling, the political 
economy of doing so has proven almost impossible thus far.  The inevitability of losers from tariff 
reform requires expending considerable political capital – and only policymakers in the Australian 
Capital Territory42 have been prepared to take on such political risks. 
 
 Network performance 
Network policy, network regulation and overall network performance has been amongst the most 
contentious aspects of Australia’s energy market reforms – especially during 2007-2015.  This period 
coincided with an enormous increase in the combined T&D Regulatory Asset Base as Figure 13 later 
illustrates.  Key policy and regulatory decisions underpin this including i). erroneous policy decisions 
by the State Governments of QLD and NSW to tighten reliability standards in 2004 (following severe 
network-related blackouts in the capital cities of Brisbane and Sydney); ii). the decision to revalue 
network assets in the mid-1990s before market start; and iii). a policy decision by all State 
Governments in 2006 that had the effect of making network regulation formulaic, which amongst 
other things eliminated the ability of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) from pursuing 
Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) write-downs (the absence of any regulatory threat being a clear 
deficiency vis-à-vis incentives of the firm).   
 
By way of brief background, until 2006 Distribution Networks were regulated by State Government 
regulatory authorities43.  From 2006 the AER took over network regulation from the State-based 
regulators.  Evidently lacking trust in the new regulator, State Government Senior Officials attempted 
to minimise the risk of regulatory error by hard-wiring a surprising number of variables which 
otherwise require considerable professional judgment.  This had the consequence of constraining the 
AER when undertaking regulatory determinations.  By way of specific example; 
   
• Regulated returns are determined by estimating a fair Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (for equity returns), and BBB rated 10-year 
corporate bonds (for debt returns).  When the regulator attempted to make determinations in 
2008 during the middle of the Global Financial Crisis, Australian credit markets had largely 
closed and the market for Australian 10-year corporate bonds literally disappeared.  The 
regulator was then forced to use international proxies, which set excessively high debt 
returns44; and 
 
• any capital invested by a network over and above the 5-year regulatory allowance could be 
automatically rolled into the RAB at the next regulatory reset without any prudency or 
efficiency review (see Grant, 2016).   
 
What followed was predictable, and was predicted – Averch & Johnson (1961) gold plating, which 
when combined with excessive returns produced sharply rising network tariffs.  Figure 13 presents the 
combined Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) of T&D networks servicing NEM customers (bar chart, LHS 
axis) and contrasts this with non-coincident NEM Maximum Demand (line chart, RHS axis) over the 
period 2006-2017.  Notice the combined T&D RAB increased from ~$40 billion to $90 billion 
(+125%) whereas Maximum Demand had increased by only 11%.  Network utilisation rates have 
consequently plunged.  The aggregate Distribution network utilisation rate in particular has fallen 
from 0.59 to 0.45, with networks in NSW and QLD exhibiting large falls of 0.51 to 0.34, and 0.60 to 
0.48, respectively.  
 
 
42 The Australian Capital Territory is pursuing a household demand tariff, under an opt-out regime.  From a wholesale market perspective, 
the Australian Capital Territory is a small sub-region of the NSW region.  However, it has its own distribution network and retail market.  
43 The Queensland Competition Authority (QCA), the New South Wales Independent Pricing & Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), The 
Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) and so on. 
44 I specifically recall the then Chief Executives of Energex and Ergon in the early 2010’s being embarrassed by the return levels in WACC 
determinations applying to their businesses.  They were also at pains to point out that any future determination will be ~250 basis points 
(bps) lower.  By the time the AER completed their Determinations in 2015, they were 400bps lower.  
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 Combined T&D RAB (in nominal dollars) vs Maximum Demand 2006-2017  
 
Source: AER, ABS. 
 
Figure 14 presents a simplified Average T&D Network Tariff for each region (line series) and in 
aggregate (bar series).  Note the nominal average network tariff has increased by 91%, from 4.5c/kWh 
to 8.5c/kWh with considerable variation amongst regions.  This data series has been constructed by 
dividing aggregate T&D revenues by T&D energy delivered, and as a result masks the rich variation 
of tariffs by consumer segment.   
 Average Network Tariff 2006-2017 (nominal dollars) 
 
Source: AER, ABS. 
 
Figure 15 presents $RAB per Customer Connection by region (line series) and in aggregate (bar series 
– in both nominal and constant 2017 dollars).  Notice the sharp increase in QLD (up 96%) and NSW 
(up 120%). 
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 RAB per Customer Connection (nominal dollars) 
 
Source: AER, ABS. 
 Regulatory & policy response 
Once the effects of a tightened reliability standard became clear to regulators and policymakers, along 
with the fact that demand growth had stalled, a series of material policy & regulatory changes would 
follow.  Both QLD and NSW abandoned their tightened reliability criteria – essentially reverting back 
to a probabilistic approach (rather than deterministic). The AER maximised the low interest rate 
environment and pushed allowable WACCs in each Determination down from 2015 – with returns 
falling from ~10% to ~6%, and more recent one Determination in the mid-5% range as illustrated in 
Figure 16. 
   Regulated Returns (5 Year Determinations made over the period 2002-2018) 
 
Source: AER, ACCC. 
The AER also adopted a hard line on Capital Expenditure (Capex) and Operating Expenditure (Opex) 
allowances, routinely rejecting as much as 30% of that proposed by network companies.  Figure 17 
illustrates the sharp reductions in Total Expenditure or Totex (i.e Capex and Opex). 
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 Allowable Totex in constant 2017 dollars 
 
Source: AER 
 
Two outstanding network policy issues that remain are i). given dramatic falls in network utilisation, 
how this excess capacity should be treated45; and ii). the efficiency of network tariff design - 
especially at the household level given sharply rising levels of Distributed Energy Resources.46  On 
the latter, the nature of the current regulatory system means that the regulator and distribution 
companies have tended to focus on the Revenue Cap, not the efficiency of tariff structures.47   
 
7. Retail Market  
Competition in the retail segment formed a key component of Australia’s energy market reforms, and 
was based largely on Great Britain’s approach to contestability (see Littlechild, 2016).  Specifically, 
in the period leading up to market start, incumbent distribution/retail supply companies held a 
monopoly franchise over their customer base, but this franchise would diminish gradually.  To ensure 
an orderly transition to a competitive market, retail electricity market contestability was phased in 
over a timetable comprising 4-6 Tranches of consumers (starting with the largest customers) and 
spanning a 4-8 year window.  The final tranche of customers (i.e. residential) had added policy 
scaffolding in the transition to a fully contestable market – a ‘regulated tariff cap’ – retained as a 
transitional measure until the so-called mass market was deemed to be workably competitive.  The 
mass market would be deemed workably competitive by reference to measures such as i). consumer 
awareness of their ability to switch supplier; ii). number of rival retailers; iii). array of products and 
the depth of discounting; iv). customer switching rates; v). market share of incumbent Retailers, vi). 
number of customers remaining on the default tariff, and so on.  
 
In Great Britain, retail competition commenced in the early-1990s with the residential/household 
segment made contestable in 1999, and residential price controls removed (i.e. price deregulation) in 
2002 (Littlechild, 2016).  NEM contestability varied by region; VIC 1994-2002; NSW 1996-2002; 
QLD 1998-2007; and SA 1998-2003.  Residential segment price deregulation occurred in 2009, 2014, 
2016 and 2013 respectively (Simshauser, 2018).   
 
45 See Simshauser (2017) and Simshauser & Akimov (2019). 
46 See Simshauser (2016). 
47 A series of 2012 Rule changes removed the formulaic approach to network regulation, and replaced them with descriptions of the factors 
the AER needed to take into account, and placed obligations on the AER to explain how they had done so. In retrospect, while this was 
sensible from an economic regulatory perspective, the replacement of formulas with words laid the ground work for (excessive) legal 
challenges.  The tendency of (or some would argue, abuse by) network businesses to so ultimately led to a COAG Energy Council decision 
to abolish Limited Merits Review. 
 
Page 26 
 
As Section 7.1 reveals, the experience of consumers over the period 2007-2015 has been characterised 
by sharply rising electricity tariffs after a period of price stability.  Rising prices, driven by network 
and wholesale prices (per Sections 5-6 above) have tended to mask the successes of retail competition 
in the NEM; the number of competitors, the array of products, discounts available, competitor rivalry, 
customer switching rates and reductions in the number of Default Tariff customers have all 
progressively intensified over time.  But as with Great Britain, the evolution of price discrimination 
has become a political target – erroneously conflating the problem of rising prices (and some poor 
practices by certain Retailers) with price dispersion. 
 
 Retail Tariff Increases  
To understand the problem of rising final consumer prices in Australia, Figure 17 presents Average 
Retail Tariffs from 1955-2019 in nominal and real terms using QLD data as the reference.  As with all 
NEM data there is variation by region, but the trend is largely consistent.  
 
 Queensland Average Residential Electricity Tariff (1955-2019) 
 
Source:  Simshauser (2018). 
 
It took 45 years of technological advancement, scale economies and microeconomic reform from 
1962-2007 to drive real tariffs from 30c/kWh down to 16c/kWh.  Policy errors would unwind those 
gains in eight years (2007-2015).  Three distinct drivers were responsible for tariff increases, viz. 
network policy failure48 (2007-2015, see Section 6), environmental schemes49 (2011-2017) and 
wholesale prices (2017-2019, see Section 5).   These pricing effects were sequential, and cumulative.   
 
Compounding matters were the timing; the sharp run-up in household electricity tariffs occurred in 
the post-Global Financial Crisis era of low consumer price inflation, low productivity, low wages 
growth and in some jurisdictions coincident record-high house prices.  Unsurprisingly (and 
understandably), and as with Great Britain, electricity prices and retail electricity markets became a 
 
48 In relation to network policy failure, in the 2004 summer Southeast Queensland experienced a series of extreme weather events which 
produced three severe episodes of distribution network-related load-shedding.  These were a political disaster because Energex, a 
government-owned distribution network company, had aggressively reduced operating and capital expenditures in prior periods to raise 
productivity and returns (as requested by Shareholding Departments).  An inquiry into the blackouts recommended a change in planning 
standards, from stochastic to deterministic, which produced a form of Averch & Johnson (1962) gold-plating.  The huge expansion in the 
capital base commenced soon after, with network tariffs more than doubling from 2007-2013 (Simshauser, 2017). 
49 Four environmental schemes impacted tariffs from 2011-2017.  To be clear, each scheme was trivial but combined they aggravated 
network-driven tariff increases.  Schemes included i). solar Feed-in Tariff (Nelson et al 2012); 20% Renewable Energy Target which was 
separated into two, viz. ii). small-scale and iii). utility scale (MacGill 2010) and iv). the carbon tax from 2012-2014.  At their peak, 
environmental schemes added 15% to an already sharply rising tariff. 
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cost of living focus event for consumer groups and politicians (see Littlechild, 2014; Waddams Price 
& Zhu, 2016; He & Reiner, 2017; Simshauser & Tiernan, 2019). 
 
 Price Discrimination the Target 
As with Great Britain, there has been nothing politically contentious about the overall performance, 
and success, of the Commercial & Industrial retail market segment.  However, as with Great Britain, 
recent performance of the NEM’s residential retail market has been the subject of a highly charged 
and politicised debate which deteriorated badly over the period 2016-2019.  For the first time in a 
generation, an Australian Prime Minister became involved in what has traditionally been a State 
Government responsibility.  And unfortunately, two separate issues were conflated; rising prices and 
price discrimination (see Simshauser, 2018, and also Littlechild, 2017 on Great Britain).  Rising 
prices are indeed a problem, including rising network charges (2010-2015) and wholesale price 
dynamics (2017-2019). But price discrimination is not; and the difficulty for policymakers is that 
misdiagnosing price discrimination for policy treatment may make some household considerably 
worse off, and leave residential consumers as class no better off (Simshauser, 2018). 
 
When contestability commences in the residential segment, prices commence a natural drift from a 
regulated uniform (two-part) tariff to discriminatory prices.  A regulated price cap is initially retained 
as a proxy safety-net for inactive household consumers as the market shifts from single monopoly 
provider to competitive market.  This regulated Default Tariff forms a price-to-beat.  Rival and new 
entrant retailers entering a franchise service area will offer discounts off the incumbent’s Default 
Tariff in order to poach customers.  Incumbent Retailers are forced to construct their own discounted 
matching-products in response.  Discounts off a Default Tariff are thus a central design feature of a 
contestable retail electricity market.   
 
The success of Full Retail Contestability (i.e. household segment) is inextricably linked to expected 
gains from switching.  Gains to household consumers are expressed as a “percentage discount off50” 
an existing Default Tariff.  When the mass market is deemed workably competitive the requirement 
for an independent regulator to set a regulated Default Tariff cap no longer exists.  Incumbent 
Retailers – who retain an obligation to supply51 in their former franchise area – must ensure that their 
Default Tariff (and associated levels of service) is available at all times.   
 
When retail prices are deregulated, the number of rival suppliers will expand rapidly because a key 
business risk (i.e. regulatory risk) has in theory been removed.52  In addition, Retailers segment the 
residential market into multiple sub-segments53 and product bundles are then constructed to target 
those discrete sub-segments.  Consequently, with the number of rival Retailers expanding and 
consumer sub-segments multiplying, the number of products – and discounts –proliferates.  
 
Certain ‘Reviews’ of residential retail market practices and performance in Australia and in Great 
Britain have pointed to price discrimination as a key policy problem; suggesting the practice produces 
unfair prices and ‘loyalty taxes’ for disengaged customers who do not switch supplier regularly (see 
Littlechild, 2016; Simshauser, 2018).  But price discrimination is unremarkable in economics, is a 
predictable outcome of rising competition and is frequently welfare enhancing.  Price discrimination 
is pervasive throughout the economy and forms a vital means by which non-trivial joint fixed and 
sunk costs are efficiently recovered by firms, especially in capital-intensive or ‘heavy’ industries (see 
Dana, 1998; Levine, 2002; Elegido, 2011; Littlechild, 2017). 
 
 
50 British research revealed only 19% of consumers preferred wanted to stop discounts being expressed in percentage terms (cf. dollar 
savings).  In addition, he strongest driver of customer activity is the size of anticipated gains from switching – not the simplicity of offers 
available.  See for example IPART (2013); Littlechild (2016); Waddams Price & Zhu (2016); He & Rainer (2017); Simshauser (2018); 
Flores & Waddams Price (2018). 
51 This is usually a condition of their retail licence. 
52 In the NEM there are now thought to be three tiers of retailers; 1st Tier incumbents (i.e. the Big 3), 2nd Tier Retailers being highly 
successful new entrants (most of which are also vertically integrated), and a 3rd Tier being boutique, sub-scale, new entrants.  
53 For example, 1) affluent urban professionals, 2) budget conscious families, 3) pensioners, 4) socially conscious households; 5) time-poor 
families; and 6) tech-savvy households. 
Page 28 
 
Nonetheless, perceptions of fairness inevitably arise when a menu of tariffs emerge and deviate from 
an historic uniform price (Dana, 1998).  Deeply discounted tariffs are popular while high Default 
Tariffs are derided by consumer groups (and in a rising price environment, with some justification).  
Regardless, their existence produces adverse media and political focusing events in which ill-advised 
claims of forcing Retailers to shift all customers en-masse to the cheapest tariff can be expected (see 
He & Rainer, 2017; Littlechild, 2017; Simshauser, 2018).  Implementation of such a policy would of 
course see cheap tariffs disappear overnight.  As an aside, the business segment of electricity markets 
exhibits extensive second- and third-degree practices yet are never questioned by policymakers.   
 
It is worth briefly reviewing some of the NEM retail market metrics to highlight the overall 
performance of the market (in spite of the network and wholesale market cost pressures). 
 
 Competitive health of the retail market 
Customer switching is frequently used as a headline measure of the health of contestable residential 
electricity markets.  Switching rates in NEM regions have typically averaged 16-22% per annum, 
which compares favourably to other Australian industry switching rates (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5 -  Industry comparison of customer switching rates  
 
Sources: Simshauser (2014, 2018). 
 
Detailed historic data for the main NEM regions is presented in Table 5.   
 
Table 6 -  NEM Electricity customer switching by Region (2007/08-2017/18) 
 
Source:  AEMO 
 
Another residential market metric that requires continual monitoring by policymakers is so-called 
‘rusted-on’ customer numbers, i.e. customers who have never switched and remain rusted-on to 
incumbent retailer Default Tariffs.  Table 7 presents rusted-on customer results for the primary NEM 
regions: 
 
Industry Switching Rate (%)
  NEM Electricity 23.5
  NEM Gas 15.9
  Broadband 15.0
  Mobile Phones 13.0
  Pay Television 12.0
  Insurance 12.0
  Airlines 10.0
  Banking 8.0
  Health 4.0
  Superannuation 4.0
Fin Year SE QLD VIC NSW SA
2007/08 20.3 22.4 10.2 18.3
2008/09 20.7 25.4 10.9 15.0
2009/10 23.3 25.9 12.8 13.9
2010/11 25.3 27.1 14.0 18.6
2011/12 21.2 26.8 17.3 22.1
2012/13 18.1 28.7 20.1 22.0
2013/14 17.0 27.3 15.2 18.3
2014/15 16.7 26.6 15.9 16.0
2015/16 16.8 24.6 16.9 16.3
2016/17 22.1 27.4 18.6 16.5
2017/18 32.2 29.0 20.0 20.4
5Yr Avg 21.0 27.0 17.3 17.5
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Table 7 -  Year of reform and market customers vs. ‘rusted-on’ customers 
 
Source: Simshauser, 2018. 
 
Table 7 notes Victoria is the oldest of the deregulated markets (2009) with the lowest number of 
rusted-on customers (10%).  After deregulating in 2016, 17% of Southeast Queensland customers are 
rusted-on.  These results compare favourably to the British Market, which has about 33% of rusted-on 
customers after Full Retail Contestability in 1999 and price deregulation in 2002 (Littlechild, 2016; 
He & Reiner, 2017).   
 
The final matter of interest is the extent of price dispersion, and for this Figure 19 presents data from 
the QLD region – ideally suited for such analysis because Regional QLD is a regulated monopoly 
(and is still subject to a regulated price based on the South East QLD cost inputs) whereas Southeast 
QLD is a fully contestable and deregulated market (thus enabling a direct comparison of a competitive 
and regulated market, which is unique by global standards).  Figure 19 presents four discrete data 
series: 
 
1. The 2018 Regulated Tariff (applied to Regional QLD customers and based on the common 
QLD region wholesale price, and Southeast QLD Network charges, and a suitable retail 
supply cost allowance);    
2. Southeast QLD competitive offers in 2015 prior to deregulation – i.e. when QLD’s Regulated 
Tariff acted as a tariff cap in the contestable Southeast QLD corner (as well as the regulated 
price to regional QLD customers) inflated to 2018 dollars; 
3. Southeast QLD competitive offers in 2018 after deregulation; and 
4. Southeast QLD competitive offers in 2019 (nb. the 2019 Regulated Tariff was 29.6c/kWh, 
~0.8% lower than the 2018 Regulated Tariff rate of 29.9c/kWh – see Figure 18).  
 
  Tariff dispersion: pre- and post-deregulation tariffs vs Benchmark 
 
 
Source: Simshauser (2018), AER. 
Region Full Retail Contestability
Price 
Deregulation
Total 
Customers
Default 
Customers
"Rusted-on" 
Customers
(Year) (Year) (%)
  SE QLD 2007 2016 1,317,957 226,018 17.0
  NSW 2002 2014 3,534,894 813,000 23.0
  SA 2003 2013 864,876 121,000 14.0
  VIC 2002 2009 2,807,280 281,000 10.0
Total NEM 8,525,006 1,441,018 16.9
 -
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Figure 19 and the data behind it provides important insights for the competitive retail market.  First, 
following deregulation of Southeast QLD in 2016, the number of rival retailers expanded from 12 to 
20 by 2018, and the number of Default Tariffs and routine discounts offered by rival retailers 
expanded from 24 to 40+.  Second, the dispersion of tariffs increased in line with general findings of 
the literature, i.e. falling either side of the regulated rate.  But to be clear, about 1.1 million out 1.3 
million Southeast QLD households were on a lower tariff than the Regulated Tariff as Figure 20 notes 
(and as a class, Southeast QLD households in aggregate were paying 7% less than the regulated rate, 
albeit with ~200,000 households paying more than the regulated rate – see Simshauser, 2018).  Third, 
by 2019 competition had forced high-end Default Tariffs closer to the counterfactual Regulated Rate, 
with deeper discounts also being exhibited. 
 
 2018 Distribution of Southeast QLD households by tariff 
 
Source: Simshauser (2018). 
 
On balance, one can conclude that the deregulated retail electricity market is performing well.  The 
Standing or Default Tariffs of retailers, which Table 7 and Figure 20 confirm is limited to a relatively 
small percentage of customers, has received a disproportionate level of political attention, and policy 
solutions of re-regulating prices through a Price Cap is unlikely to end well for those consumers 
active in the market (in the medium term) as retailers progressively re-adjust their market 
segmentations and profit strategies.   
 
This is not to suggest the retail market is operating without fault; vulnerable rusted-on customers 
represent a misallocation problem (i.e. low income households are on a tariff designed for an inelastic 
segment), and discounts are no longer anchored to a common price.  Both of these matters are serious 
policy problems that require further work by Retailers and policymakers, respectively. 
 
8. The Strengths & Weaknesses of Australia’s Energy Market Reforms 
 
In light of the recent problems emerging in Australia’s NEM, it is easiest to start with a review of 
weaknesses.  There have been a series of reform weaknesses which stem from policy failures.  With 
the benefit of hindsight, these include the following: 
 
1. The lack of a clear gas market and LNG export capacity policy architecture prior to LNG 
investment commitments in 2010-2012.  Emphasizing the benefit of hindsight, LNG export 
licencing should have restricted to the availability of ‘booked’ 2P Reserves above that 
required to service the domestic market for natural gas.  This missing policy needed to be 
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coordinated at the national level because no individual jurisdiction is able to reasonably 
assess, on a cost-benefit basis, east coast Reserves adequacy.  Gas shortages (Fig. 5) on 
Australia’s east coast remain an unresolved problem, and the impact on electricity price is 
evident as the 34 Quarterly data points in Figure 21 illustrate (nb. correlation of 0.88).  
Forward resolution needs to turn to prospective measures on new supply, rather than 
retrospective policy intervention which may inflame perceptions of sovereign risk. 
 
 Quarterly Average: NEM Spot Price vs NEM Gas Price 
 
 
Source: Grattan (2019), AEMO. 
 
2. Policy discontinuity and design errors vis-à-vis climate change policy, and a general lack of 
a united climate & energy policy architecture.  At least four Australian Prime Ministers have 
lost their leadership through a two-decades long climate change policy war with both sides of 
politics suffering equally.  This missing policy has adversely affected investment continuity in 
the NEM, and remains a live problem at the time of writing.  Furthermore, the policies that do 
exist, such as the expanded 20% Renewable Energy Target amongst an array of others (see 
Simshauser & Tiernan, 2019) were incompatible with the NEM design in that investment was 
largely disconnected from forward markets – instead, investment was being driven by side-
markets.  This problem risks being further compounded by the rising use of government-
initiated CfDs; while highly effective at encouraging new capacity to meet various policy 
objectives (e.g. navigate missing policies relating to climate change etc), government-initiated 
CfDs are incompatible with the NEM design (Simshauser, 2019b).  Whether the NEM’s 
wholesale market design needs to change to suit CfDs, or alternate mechanisms need to be 
found to suit the NEM design, is an open question.  
 
3. Plant exit policy, and coal plant exit in particular, could have been better managed in the 
NEM if the gas market had been functioning properly.  But regardless of this, or perhaps 
because of it, transparency around exit timing needed to be greatly improved.  This missing 
policy has been semi-resolved by way of a Rule Change that requires continuous disclosure of 
plant exit timing (referred to as the 3-year closure Rule).  However, looking forward, each 
State Government should have a well-rehearsed plant exit policy; the closure of the 1600MW 
Hazelwood Power Station (20% VIC market share) over 6 consecutive trading days with 5-
months’ notice did not represent an orderly exit.  In the event, annual wholesale spot market 
turnover rose from $7.7 billion to $17.2 billion either side of the Hazelwood exit.  In 
hindsight, some component of Hazelwood’s required $400m capital expenditure program 
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could have been taxpayer- (or electricity consumer-) funded, on a cost-plus basis so as to 
ensure an orderly exit and provide the market with more time to adjust given predictable entry 
lags.  Such a policy should not be interpreted nor designed to prevent an exit decision per se, 
and above all, should avoid outcomes that lead to ‘costs being socialised and profits being 
privatised’.  It should be a contingent policy, used judiciously to facilitate orderly exit, and 
only applied in critical circumstances. 
 
4. Competition policy; with the benefit of hindsight, the Commonwealth Government, State 
Governments and the ACCC allowed an excess of horizontal M&A events.   State 
Governments sought to maximise privatisation sale proceeds, and in my view the ACCC 
over-diagnosed vertical integration, and under-diagnosed more adverse horizontal 
aggregations. 
 
5. The over-diagnosis of price discrimination by various agencies and governments is likely 
to adversely impact a component of NEM reforms that has generally performed well.  This is 
not to suggest the retail market is without fault; clear weaknesses include the lack of 
jurisdictional coordination over the timing deregulation events across NEM regions (i.e. lack 
of synchronisation), how Retailers deal with vulnerable customers on Default Tariffs, and the 
lack of a common anchor for advertised product discounts.  But a policy of re-instating a 
regulated price cap will not solve the underlying problem of affordability, a point in 
economics that the AEMC has also recently noted. 
 
6. While NEM governance has certain unique advantages (e.g. strict segregation amongst 
market institutions), in the absence of a formal binding agreement to meet certain policy 
objectives, COAG Energy Council ultimately becomes a weakness of NEM governance in 
that it requires multiple State and Territory Governments (and multiple political parties), and 
the Commonwealth, to agree to material policy change.  Furthermore, State Governments 
have de-skilled their Energy Departments over time (notably, there are virtually no specialist 
Energy Departments remaining. In most jurisdictions, the former Department of Energy now 
forms part of a broader mega-departmental structure, with the Departmental Secretary or 
Director-General spread thinly across the long list of line responsibilities).  It is worth noting 
that during the 1990s, ‘competition payments’ from Commonwealth to State Governments 
were used to encourage a united approach to policy and reform objectives.   
 
7. Network Regulation in the NEM proved to be a weakness throughout the period 2004 to 
2015.  Critical errors were made by certain State Governments vis-à-vis reliability standards, 
and the Rules from 2006-2012 were too formulaic to respond to the unique conditions of the 
Global Financial Crisis.  These two conditions proved to be devastating for network prices as 
the charts in Section 6 illustrated. 
 
The strengths of the Australian reform experience could be summarised as follows: 
 
1. The NEM’s energy-only, gross pool market design, very high VoLL and associated 
market for forward derivatives has delivered Resource Adequacy and withstood a wide 
array of economic and technical conditions.  Market failures can generally be attributed to 
missing policies of LNG export capacity, climate change and plant exit, design errors of 
renewable schemes, and the application (or lack thereof) of competition policy vis-à-vis initial 
privatisation events.  
 
2. The NEM’s core governance structure and approach to open-source Rulemaking has had 
the beneficial effect of minimising misguided political interference, and ensured Rule changes 
have purposefully thought through economic trade-offs.  For example, the strict segregation 
between AEMC (i.e. Rulemaking body) and AEMO (System Operator) means Rule changes 
which enhance system operations and spot prices efficiency can be weighed against any 
efficiency losses that might arise in forward markets and in turn, how capital markets interact 
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with the energy market.  Moreover, the segregation between the AEMC and AER has the 
effect of separating Policy Advice and Rulemaking that follow such advice (AEMC 
functions) from the entity which enforces compliance with Rules, and acts as industry 
economic regulator (AER functions).  The evidence on these separations is that capital 
markets have had confidence in the market and market institutions to back required 
investment.  It is however noteworthy that interference by the Commonwealth Government 
has been rising, ironically due to market failures associated with the missing policies and the 
misdiagnosis of price discrimination (i.e. weaknesses 1, 2, 3 and 5 above). 
 
3. While I have argued that State Governments and the ACCC have allowed too much 
horizontal aggregation, the same institutions have allowed (or been forced by courts to allow) 
capital markets to determine vertical business boundaries.  Specifically, it was the capital 
markets that initiated the dis-aggregation of Retail businesses from Distribution Network 
businesses, and also the re-integration of Generation with Retail.  This has reduced the cost of 
capital in both the regulated and merchant segments. 
 
4. Competition in the NEM’s Retail Markets has generally performed well, especially in the 
industrial segment.  Rising electricity prices and associated affordability for certain household 
segments are indeed a problem, but to be clear these relate to sequential rises in Network 
prices, (weakness 7 above) and wholesale prices (caused by the missing polices, weaknesses 
1, 2 and 3 above).   
 
9. Conclusion 
This article has provided a background to Australian energy market reform experience, and explained 
the critical importance of reform sequencing.  The review of industrial organization in the NEM 
highlighted that the reform blueprint was eventually altered by the capital markets, which had a 
preference for aligning (and mitigating) the risk characteristics of merchant businesses through 
vertical integration, and isolating regulated from merchant business units.  The performance of the 
wholesale market revealed an institutional design that remained largely true to its objective function 
of enhancing productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency.  But this high-performing energy-only 
market design with its high VoLL and associated forward markets could not navigate market failures 
associated with what I have described as the missing policies, relating to LNG export capacity, 
climate change policy discontinuity and design errors, and disorderly coal plant exit at-scale.  
 
The review of the NEM’s regulated networks revealed major historic policy failures, specifically 
coincident (and coincidental) misguided changes to reliability standards in QLD and NSW along with 
an initial formulaic approach to network regulation when professional judgement was required.  
Notably, both policy changes were instituted without a formal policy development cycle, and the 
unintended consequences have severely damaged the network sector.   
 
The final two sections covered the Retail Market, which was on balance argued to have operated well, 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the Australian reform experience.   
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